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Predicting general election outcomes: campaigns and changing voter 
knowledge at the 2017 general election in England 
 
 
 
Abstract. A growing literature suggests that the result for each constituency at British general 
elections can be predicted using ‘citizen forecasts’ obtained through voter surveys. This may be true 
for the majority of constituencies where the result at previous contests was a substantial majority 
for one party’s candidates: few ‘safe seats’ change hands. But is it true in the marginal 
constituencies, where elections are won and lost? Analysis of such ‘citizen forecast’ data for the 
Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies in 2017 indicates not. Although respondents were 
aware of the seats’ relative marginality and of general trends in party support during the campaign, 
they could not separate out those that were eventually lost by each party from those that were won 
again, even in seats where the elected party won comfortably. 
 
Keywords Forecasting, Wisdom of the Crowd, Constituencies, Marginality, England, 2017 
 
 
 
As a British general election approaches, a wide range of political actors want to know which seats 
are safe, which will be likely lost and, most importantly, which seats will be marginal. For decades, 
the main information provided by opinion polls has focused on each party’s likely share of the votes 
cast nationally. In many electoral systems based on proportional representation this is sufficient to 
give a good approximation to the number of seats each party will gain. In those using single-member 
district systems, such as that for elections to the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, however, 
the relationship between vote share and seat allocation is far from constant across parties and 
elections because of several interacting elements of the geographies of party support (Gudgin and 
Taylor, 1979; Johnston et al., 2001). Estimating the likely number of seats each party will win – and 
even which will be the largest party when the election result is likely to be close – is difficult from 
aggregate polling data because of varying disproportionality in the seats to votes ratio. When an 
election result is announced, therefore, the allocation of seats across the parties may come as a 
surprise to many observers – as was the case at the 2015 and 2017 UK general elections – because 
they have been unable to assess accurately how the vote shares will be translated into seat 
numbers.1 
 
Recent changes in polling practices, most notably the introduction of online sampling, have 
allowed companies and academics to survey large numbers of respondents more frequently 
throughout the campaign. Rather than relatively small polls of national samples, therefore, it is 
possible to survey a substantial number of people across most if not all of a country’s constituencies. 
This allows the application of what Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2011) have called ‘citizen forecasting’ 
(see also Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 1989: Graefe, 2014). They argue that voters locally are well 
aware which party is likely to win in their home constituency so that survey or poll data including 
questions exploring that likelihood can give more precise information than previously available on 
the likely election outcome, both locally and nationally.2 This argument has been taken up by Murr 
                                                          
1 The exit poll conducted for the country’s main TV stations was remarkably successful and predicting to 
allocation of seats, however: Curtice et al. (2017) 
2 Interestingly, this argument runs counter to that of Achen and Bartels (2016, 277) who stress ‘the sheer 
magnitude of most people’s ignorance about politics’. 
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(2015a, 2015b) who has used such survey questions to explore the predictability of UK general 
election and US presidential election outcomes with some considerable success. Comparable 
research in Germany has shown that better forecasts are provided by individuals in large social 
networks containing considerable political expertise and which involve substantial political 
discussion (Leiter et al., 2018), although a Belgian study has suggested that individuals with strong 
partisan attachments are more likely to over-estimate their party’s chances of success (Stiers and 
Dassonneville, 2018). 
 
The British Election Study’s (BES) surveys at recent general elections have asked respondents 
which party they think will win in their home constituency. Murr’s (2011) analyses of the 2010 BES 
data found that a majority of respondents correctly identified which party would win their local seat. 
More importantly, aggregating responses by constituency to create group forecasts produced an 86 
per cent rate of correct estimates for constituencies, with the predicted seat shares overall 
conforming to the outcome of that contest (a hung parliament). Murr (2016) then applied the 
procedure to a series of seven recent elections; on average 61 per cent of individual respondents to 
various BES surveys correctly predicted their local winner – reaching a high of 72 per cent in 1997 
(which Labour won by a landslide) but a low of 55 per cent in 2010 (which election produced a hung 
parliament). He again found that the ‘wisdom of crowds’ was better than the wisdom of individuals: 
when voters were aggregated by constituency, the percentage of constituency outcomes correctly 
predicted averaged 85 over the seven elections. He thus argued that the ‘wisdom of crowds’, as 
identified through straightforward survey questions, could be deployed to provide valid 
foreknowledge of an election’s outcome, not just of what percentage of the votes each party would 
obtain but also how many seats each would occupy in the House of Commons. 
 
One potential drawback to this argument is that all British constituencies are not equal in 
terms of the predictability of the outcome. Most constituencies – and an increasing proportion of 
the total over recent elections – are what is normally considered safe for one of the contesting 
parties: its margin of victory at the previous contest was such that, bar either a major national swing 
against the incumbent party or a local outcome deviating substantially from the national pattern, 
the same party would win there again at the next election (Curtice, 2015, 2018). Most voters in most 
places should therefore be aware which party is likely to win in their home constituency; if it rarely 
changes then all they need is to remember who won last time. 
 
In the more marginal constituencies, however, in order to estimate correctly the likely victor 
there voters would not only need to know which party won at the last election and by what margin 
but also what the national trend in party support has been since then and whether the local 
trajectory is following that pattern. There should be greater uncertainty/inaccuracy in voters’ 
evaluations in those marginal seats, therefore, especially if the pattern of support is not trending in 
the same direction across all such constituencies. Given the importance of those marginal seats to 
the eventual election outcome, the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ may fail in those places where it would 
be most important to the overall outcome. England currently has 533 constituencies; if the outcome 
is almost certain in 400 of them then being able to predict the likely result in each of the other 133 is 
crucial to forecasting the outcome nationally. But is this task feasible for voters? 
 
The 2017 general election in England provides an excellent opportunity to explore the 
geography of voter knowledge in the light of this potential relative failing of the ‘wisdom of the 
crowds’ argument.3 Unlike previous contests since the 1970s, just two parties – Conservative and 
Labour – predominated in the election, winning 87.5 per cent of the votes between them and 524 of 
                                                          
3 Scotland and Wales are omitted from the analyses because of the important presence of nationalist parties 
there, notably in Scotland where the SNP won 56 of the 59 seats in 2015 and 35 in 2017. Northern Ireland was 
not covered by the BES. 
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the 533 seats. The real focus of the 2017 contest there was on the 124 marginal seats won by one of 
them at the previous contest (just two years earlier) by a margin over the other of 15 percentage 
points or less.4 Of those seats, twenty-one of the sixty-six held by the Conservatives in 2015 were 
won by Labour two years later, and six of the fifty-eight held by Labour were lost to the 
Conservatives. Figure 1 shows each party’s winning margin in both 2015 and 2017 in those 124 
marginal seats: positive values indicate a Labour majority and negative margins a Conservative 
majority. Were local residents aware that these were the constituencies where a change could take 
place? 
 
That question is of particular interest because in 2017 it was not necessarily the most 
marginal seats that changed hands. There is only weak evidence of a uniform swing towards Labour 
across the marginal constituencies, as illustrated by the variation about the regression line in Figure 
1 (its r2 value was only 0.49). With uniform swing, the seats that changed hands would have been 
those close to the vertical line in Figure 1. Labour did win most of the seats held by the 
Conservatives by a very small majority, but it also won some others with larger Conservative 2015 
majorities – including three where that majority was greater than 10 percentage points – whereas 
most of their seats won by similar margins then were held by the Conservatives. Were local voters 
aware of those varying fortunes between the two parties? Similarly, were voters in Labour-held 
seats that shifted their support to the Conservatives aware that victory was more likely there in 2017 
than in the remainder that stayed with Labour? None of the six Labour-held seats that were lost to 
the Conservatives in 2017 were very marginal: the smallest 2015 margin in any one of them was 3.94 
percentage points, and Labour retained control of the fourteen seats it won in 2015 with smaller 
margins. Were local residents aware that these seats were trending towards the Conservatives 
whereas others with similar outcomes in 2015 were not? 
 
Furthermore, those swings – towards Labour in most Conservative-held marginals and 
towards the Conservatives in just a small number of Labour-held seats (Figure 1) – probably only 
became apparent late in the campaign. When the election was called the Conservatives had a 
substantial lead over Labour in all opinion polls – as much as 20 points in some (Allen, 2018; Denver, 
2018) – and the Conservatives anticipated winning a large number of the Labour-held marginals (see 
Shipman, 2017); indeed, the Prime Minister launched the Conservative manifesto in one of those 
marginals, which was retained by Labour with an increased majority (1.0 points in 2015; 11.14 in 
2017). As the campaign proceeded Labour closed that gap substantially, especially after the parties’ 
manifestoes were published. Were voters aware of this trend, and did the change register most in 
those constituencies that the Conservatives lost – but not in those that they gained from Labour? 
 
To address these questions, we use data from the 2017 British Election Study (BES) panel 
survey, focusing on those 124 marginal constituencies where the Conservative and Labour parties 
occupied the first and second places in both 2015 and 2017. As argued above, the ‘wisdom of the 
crowd’ argument is almost certain to hold in the large number of safe seats that characterises most 
British general elections, so their inclusion in any analysis would undoubtedly produce a high success 
rate. Analysing only the marginal seats focuses on the places where the overall accuracy of any 
forecast will be determined. A highly accurate forecast requires local voters to be certain which 
party will win in those places where victory is least certain. 
 
Knowing the margins 
 
                                                          
4 Elsewhere in the United Kingdom the main focus was on the number of seats that might change hands in 
Scotland as a result of a decline in support for the Scottish National Party: because of the very different 
pattern of party competition there, we have looked separately at what happened in  Scotland (Johnston et al.,  
2019). 
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In the BES pre-campaign survey, conducted between 24 April and 3 May 2017 immediately after the 
unexpected election was called on 18 April 2017, respondents were asked, for each party (though 
we analyse only the responses to the Conservative and Labour parties), on a scale from 0-100 ‘how 
likely is it that … [the named party] ... will win the General Election in your local constituency?’ (their 
emphasis), with 0 indicating ‘very unlikely’ and 100 ‘very likely’. In the constituencies studied, these 
two questions were answered by 3,100 respondents (i.e. none gave an answer of ‘not sure’ to either 
question), giving an average of twenty-six per constituency, with a standard deviation of seven (the 
maximum in any constituency was 55 and the minimum 8). Respondents were then sampled once 
again on one day during the campaign (an average of 109 per day) and asked the same questions. 
Given the small numbers questioned each day, the campaign is collapsed into four periods each 
containing one-quarter of the respondents – named Early, Early-Mid, Mid-Late and Late here.5  
 
We present two sets of analyses. The first are conducted at the constituency scale exploring 
the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ in those seats, for which the data are presented in graphical form – 
necessary because there are few general trends that can be captured by either tabular presentations 
or statistical analyses; much of the focus is on the outliers, the constituencies that were won and lost 
in 2017. The second comprises statistical analyses conducted at the individual level, designed to 
explore which voters correctly identified those seats where a change of party incumbency occurred 
in 2017. 
 
According to the pre-campaign survey, and in line with Murr’s (2016) results from earlier 
elections, 73.1 per cent of respondents correctly predicted which party would win in their 
constituency – i.e., they gave it the highest score on the 0-100 scale to the winning party. As 
anticipated here, however, they were least likely to be correct in the marginal constituencies. Figure 
2 shows the percentage of respondents who correctly identified the likely winner in all English 
constituencies,6 according to the successful party’s margin of victory in 2015 and which party won 
there in 2017. Although the correlation between the two variables is virtually zero – reflecting both 
the curvilinear shape of the general relationship and the wide scatter of points for any particular 
value of the independent variable – nevertheless the percentage getting the outcome right was 
generally much lower in the more marginal seats. Nearly all of the constituencies where the 
percentage identifying the winner correctly was less than 50 had been won by a margin of less than 
20 points in 2015; most were won in 2017 by either Labour or the Liberal Democrats – victories 
largely unanticipated by local residents when the election was called.7 
 
Were respondents aware whether they lived in a marginal constituency? The BES pre-
campaign survey asked respondents to indicate, on a scale from 0-10, how likely it was that their 
vote made a difference in their constituency. Figure 3 shows the mean score for respondents across 
all constituencies, graphed against the winning party’s majority there in 2015. Although the overall 
correlation is low because of the wide scatter of points and the slightly non-linear nature of any 
relationship, voters were generally aware of their local situation. The smaller the margin of victory in 
2015, the greater the likelihood of a constituency mean value of 5.0 or more, indicating that 
respondents thought their votes would be important in determining the local outcome. 
 
                                                          
5 Early responders were those interviewed between 5-12 May, inclusive; Early-Mid responders were 
interviewed between 13-22 May; Mid-Late responders between 23-30 May; and Late responders between 31 
May and 7 June. 
6 One of the 533 constituencies was excluded since that being defended by the incumbent Speaker was, 
following convention, not contested by either of the two main parties. 
7 Few correctly predicted that the Green party would win again in the seat its candidate held at both the 2010 
and 2015 general elections: the mean score for a Conservative win in Brighton Pavilion in 2017 was 41 and for 
Labour 51. 
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Just after the 2017 election was announced, and before formal campaigning started, 
therefore, BES respondents were in general aware of whether they lived in a marginal constituency, 
and voters living in marginal seats were much less accurate in predicting the likely winner there. 
Focusing on the Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies only, Figure 4 shows that in 
Conservative-held seats (to the left of the vertical line) there was a marked difference between 
those won again by the Conservatives in 2017, where at least 50 per cent of respondents correctly 
predicted the local outcome, and those won by Labour, where on average only about 20 per cent of 
the respondents were correct; the majority expected another Conservative victory. The differences 
were slightly less stark in Labour-held seats (to the right of the vertical line); more were correct in 
seats won again by Labour than in those gained by the Conservatives, but the substantial number of 
seats won by Labour in 2017 where less than half of respondents correctly estimated that victory 
indicates that before the campaign started many voters in Labour-held marginal constituencies 
expected that they would be lost to the Conservatives. 
 
Seeing the campaign changes 
 
A Conservative landslide was widely anticipated when the election was called. The gap between the 
parties narrowed during the campaign, however, and BES respondents were aware of this shift, as 
shown in responses to a question asking on an 11-point scale (0-10) whether they expected each 
party to win a majority of seats in the House of Commons. In the pre-campaign survey the mean 
response for the Conservatives was 7.66 and for Labour 2.82. As the campaign progressed responses 
to the same question asked of respondents to the rolling sub-sample showed the gap closing (Figure 
5); a Conservative majority was still considered the most likely outcome, but its probability declined 
quite substantially as Labour’s support increased. 
 
BES respondents were generally aware of national shifts in party support, therefore, but was 
this overall view reflected in their estimates of the likely outcome in their home constituencies? In 
general, the mean response in each constituency reflected the local situation, as shown in Figure 6 
for Labour across all constituencies (where for ease of representation data for only a one-in-five 
random sample of constituencies are shown). Labour’s margin of defeat-victory in 2015 occupies the 
horizontal axis (seats lost then are to the left of the vertical line) and the mean expectation is on the 
vertical axis, along with the associated one standard deviation variation around that. Those large 
standard deviations (averaging around 25 points) indicate considerable variability across 
respondents within constituencies (because of skewness some of +1sd values exceed 100 whereas 
some of the -1sd values are less than zero). Nevertheless, the general trend is clear; the better 
Labour’s performance in 2015 the greater the local expectation that it would win there in 2017. 
 
That trend was also clear in the marginal constituencies. Figure 7a shows the pre-campaign 
mean likelihood of victory for both parties as a function of Labour’s margin of victory or defeat in 
2015, with the associated regression lines. For the Conservatives, the mean likelihood of a further 
victory was greater than 50 in all seats won in 2015 (i.e. those to the left of the vertical line). 
Expectations were lower in Labour-held seats, but above 50 for a Conservative victory in most. For 
Labour, a similar general pattern is shown by the upward-sloping regression line (there was an r2 
value of 0.67 associated with each regression), but the mean likelihoods were generally lower with 
expectations below 50 in almost all Conservative-held seats. Further, the two regression lines 
crossed where the value on the horizontal axis indicated a Labour victory by 5 percentage points in 
2015: on average, therefore, in seats Labour won by that majority or less in 2015 respondents had 
greater expectations of a Conservative than a Labour victory. 
 
Figure 7b replicates that graph for the sub-sample questioned in the last eight days of the 
campaign. (Because of the smaller numbers involved, these estimates are ‘noisier’: the r2 associated 
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with the regressions are 0.47 for the Conservatives and 0.33 for Labour.) Although the same general 
patterns recur, some noticeable differences suggest changing expectations. Many fewer 
Conservative-held seats have mean expectations of a Labour victory of less than 50 just before votes 
were cast than when the election was called some six weeks earlier, indicating growing appreciation 
that Labour may gain some of them – although in almost all cases the likelihood of a Conservative 
victory remained considerably higher. Furthermore, the point where the two regressions intersect is 
much closer to the zero value on the horizontal axis in Figure 7b than in Figure 7a, suggesting a shift 
in expectations towards Labour. 
 
The pattern of changes in those expectations is shown in Figure 8, where the mean for each 
party in each constituency in the final days of the campaign is compared with that for the pre-
campaign survey (a positive value indicates an increased likelihood). For Labour, Figure 8a indicates 
a modest increase (of less than ten points on the 101-point scale) in almost all Conservative-held 
marginals (i.e. those to the left of the vertical line), including in all of those where Labour eventually 
won. But among those constituencies where there was an improvement in the assessed likelihood of 
a Labour victory those which it did win do not stand out relative to those where the Conservatives 
retained the seat. Local respondents could identify the general trend towards Labour, it seems, but 
not those where its prospects were especially enhanced. In the Labour-held seats, somewhat 
surprisingly, the mean expectation of a further Labour victory fell in about one-third, including four 
of those lost to the Conservatives but also nineteen where Labour retained the seat. 
 
Figure 8b shows that, despite the overall trend in the polls, on average local residents in 
marginal seats were nevertheless more likely to increase rather than decrease their estimated 
likelihood of a further Conservative victory in the Conservative-held marginals (i.e. those to the left 
of the vertical line); the Labour advance was recognised, but nevertheless the Conservatives were 
still expected to perform well. In those Conservative-held seats there was a small increase – less 
than five points in most cases – in the expectation of a further Conservative victory, even in the 
fourteen seats which Labour eventually gained in the election. In the Labour-held marginals (those 
to the right of the vertical line), there was an increase averaging more than ten points in three of the 
seats lost to the Conservatives, indicating that their advance was widely appreciated there, but 
almost no change in three of the others. By a ratio of more than 3 to 1, local residents were more 
likely to increase than decrease their estimates of the likelihood of a Conservative gain as the 
campaign progressed. 
 
These graphs suggest that while residents in marginal Labour-Conservative constituencies 
were aware of Labour’s increased support nationally as the campaign proceeded and reflected this 
in their estimates of its likelihood of winning in most of those seats, nevertheless they still thought 
that, on average, the Conservatives would outperform Labour there. Further, within these general 
trends there was little evidence of clarity regarding which seats Labour would win from the 
Conservatives, and vice versa. This is illustrated in Figure 9a for the Conservative-held marginals 
only. Of the ten seats they won in 2015 by a majority of four percentage points or less, in two of the 
five that were lost the average likelihood of a Labour victory according to those surveyed in the last 
days of the campaign was less than 50 – as it was also in another won in 2015 by just over four 
points. The mean likelihood of a Labour victory in the other – somewhat safer? – seats exceeded 50 
in all but seven, but in only two of the twelve eventually won by Labour did that likelihood stand out 
with mean values exceeding 70. In general, even in the last days of the campaign local residents in 
those Conservative-held marginal seats were unable to clearly separate those that were going to be 
won from those that would be lost. 
 
It was the same with the Conservative gains in the Labour-held marginals (Figure 9b). In all 
but twelve of those seats on average respondents interviewed near the end of the campaign 
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estimated the likelihood of a Conservative victory as greater than 50 – but the Conservatives only 
gained six of those seats, and in two of them the mean estimated likelihood was less than 50.  
 
Who thought what outcome was likely? 
 
Throughout the campaign there was little change in the overall accuracy of respondents’ forecasts of 
the outcome in the constituencies: 73.1 per cent predicted the winner in their home constituency 
correctly before the campaign started, and when they were interviewed during the campaign the 
percentages correct were 72.8 in the first eight days, followed by 75.0, 75.4 and 75.0 in the 
subsequent periods. ‘Errors’ were greater in the marginal constituencies. 
 
Were some types of respondent more likely to rate a party’s chances in their local 
constituency greater than others? If they were well informed about the situation, not only at the 
start of the campaign but also as it proceeded and the parties’ prospects changed, there should be a 
close correlation between marginality and the assessed likelihood of victory. There was a correlation 
but, as Figure 6 indicated, it was weak because of considerable variation within each constituency. 
What could account for that? Those more interested in politics might be better informed (and 
perhaps more accurate too?) than those who were not, as might those contacted by the parties 
during the campaign compared to those not contacted. As parties are generally rational in raising 
and allocating their scarce campaigning resources (Johnston and Pattie, 2014) they are likely to focus 
them by concentrating the intensity of local campaigning on the seats they consider winnable. 
People contacted by a party might interpret that as showing that the party thinks that victory is 
possible there and so solicits support; those whose support is canvassed by a party should estimate 
its chances of a local victory greater than those who received no such contact. Further, those more 
committed to a party – i.e. who identify with it –  should be better aware, and perhaps more 
optimistic, of its local chances than those who identify with either another or with none. We 
therefore anticipate that those interested in politics, those who identify with a party, and those 
whose support is canvassed by a party are more likely be aware of both its prospects of victory in 
their home constituency and the change in those prospects as the campaign proceeds than those 
who are politically uninterested, who do not identify with a party, and those whose support is not 
sought. 
 
To evaluate those arguments four regression models were fitted, separately for the Labour- and 
Conservative-held marginals. The independent variables were (all but the first taken from BES 
responses: the interest in politics and party identification measures were taken from the pre-
campaign survey): 
• The margin of victory in the constituency in 2015; 
• Whether the respondent was not very, fairly, or very interested in politics, compared with 
those who were not all interested; 
• Whether the respondent identified not very strongly, fairly strongly, and very strongly with 
the Labour/Conservative party, compared with those who did not identify with it; 
• Whether the respondent had been contacted by either the Labour or the Conservative party 
in the four weeks preceding the interview;8 and, for those interviewed during the campaign,  
• Whether the interview was conducted during the second (Early-Mid), third (Mid-Late) or 
fourth (Late) campaign period compared with the first (Early). 
Further, because the previous analyses of the estimated outcomes at the constituency scale 
suggested that although respondents were generally aware of trends in party support over the 
campaign they were not able to clearly identify the outcome, a final variable was: 
                                                          
8 In each survey, respondents were asked whether they had been contacted by any of the parties in the 
preceding four weeks. 
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• Whether the party under consideration won the seat in 2017. 
This is the key variable in assessing whether respondents were aware of the trends in their home 
constituencies. If the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, this indicates that within the 
general trends local respondents estimated a party’s likely success greater where it did indeed win 
than where it did not; in the terms of the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ argument, they gave a higher 
expected victory score in marginal seats that the party won than in those where it lost.  
 
The dependent variable in the first set of models was each respondent’s pre-campaign 
estimate of the likelihood of either a Labour or a Conservative local victory, obtained immediately 
after the election was called. Four separate regressions are reported. The first two relate to the 
Labour-held marginals and the second two to those held by the Conservatives: in each pair, the first 
regression is of the estimates of a Labour victory locally and the second is of those for a Conservative 
victory. The results include a substantial number of statistically significant relationships at the 0.05 
level or better, but also noteworthy are the very low R2 values (Table 1). These undoubtedly largely 
reflect the variability in responses noted above (Figure 6) and the wide range of values, from 0-100, 
on which respondents were invited to assess each party’s likelihood of winning locally; it invites a 
level of precision that very few could reasonably be expected to deploy and differences of perhaps 
10-20 points on that scale may reflect nothing more than measurement error.9 
 
Respondents were generally aware of their home constituencies’ marginality with positive, 
statistically significant relationships between the estimated likelihoods of each party winning there 
and its margin of victory in 2015 plus complementary negative, statistically significant relationships 
between its estimated likelihood and its opponent’s margin then. Those very interested in politics on 
average gave quite substantially larger estimates for each party than those not interested, and very 
strong party identifiers estimated its likely success much higher – and its opponent’s much lower – 
than those who identified with the party less strongly or not at all. (In their analysis of citizen 
forecasts in Belgium Stier and Dassonneville, 2018, refer to the latter as ‘wishful thinking’ on the part 
of party identifiers.) Additionally, before the campaign started, those in Conservative-held seats 
contacted by Labour in the preceding four weeks rated its chances of success greater than those 
who had not been contacted – they had some appreciation of Labour’s potential advance because 
the party canvassed their support.10 
 
Regarding which party won the seat in 2017 the coefficients for the final variable confirm 
the earlier findings that respondents’ estimates were not very accurate. Two of the four regression 
coefficients are statistically significant, although fairly small – but each has the wrong sign. In 
Labour-held seats respondents gave slightly lower estimates of the likelihood of its victory again in 
2017 in those the party held than in those that it lost (a coefficient of -4.40); similarly, a coefficient 
of -2.27 indicates that on average respondents in Conservative-held seats estimated, all other things 
held constant, its chances of victory there slightly less than in those lost to Labour. 
 
                                                          
9 They may of course also suggest under-specified models, but exploration identified no others that made 
substantial, readily interpreted, contributions to the ‘explanations’. In addition, the wide range of values for 
the dependent variable (1-100) suggests that there may be a great deal of measurement error: one person 
expecting a party almost certainly to win may give a score of 85 whereas another may give 95. The larger the 
measurement error the larger the standard errors of estimates and hence smaller the likelihood of finding a 
significant relationship (see Blackwell et al., 2017); the significant relationships reported here are thus very 
likely conservative and we can be relatively confident that we have identified ‘real’ relationships. 
10 Several other variables were included in exploratory regressions, such as UKIP’s performance in the 2015 
election and whether it fielded a candidate in the constituency in 2017: none were significant. Interactions 
between the variables included in the regressions were also explored, again with insignificant outcomes. 
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The dependent variables in the second set of models were respondents’ estimates of the 
likelihoods of success as indicated in the campaign surveys (Table 2). The expected significant 
relationships with marginality emerged again, but the statistically significant relationships with 
interest in politics reported in Table 1 are not repeated: once the campaign was underway this was 
no longer an influence on how they estimated each party’s potential. The relationships with party 
identification were repeated, however; strong partisans rated their party’s local chances 
substantially higher – and their opponents’ substantially lower. Having one’s support canvassed by a 
party was also influential, especially for Labour; those contacted by the party during the campaign 
on average gave the likelihood of it winning 5-6 points higher than those not contacted.11 
 
Reflecting the overall campaign trends, there are also statistically significant differences in 
the estimated likelihoods according to when the respondents were interviewed – again, especially 
for Labour. Those interviewed in the last campaign period gave it an average estimate some 8-12 
points greater than those interviewed prior to the campaign’s outset. There was no comparable fall 
in the estimates of a likely Conservative victory, however; voters identified Labour’s advance but still 
thought, on average, that the Conservatives would prevail in many of those marginal seats. But 
which ones? As in the previous analyses, there is no evidence that respondents separated out those 
that each party would win or lose; all four of the coefficients for which party won in 2017 are small 
and statistically insignificant. Voters were aware of the general trends in party support over the 
campaign, but not clear which party would prevail in the marginal seats. 
 
A scale ranging from 0 to 100 suggests that respondents were asked to consider the 
potential of each party winning as percentage odds, so that if they gave an estimate of 70 for one 
party their estimates for all other parties combined could not exceed 30. This is not how most 
responded, however: many respondents’ odds summed across all parties exceeded 100 so the 
judgements were relative but not elements of zero-sum games. Which of the two parties’ 
respondents consider most likely to win is measured in this next set of analyses by the difference 
between each respondent’s Conservative and Labour estimates; a positive value indicates that a 
Conservative victory was considered more likely than a Labour victory, with the reverse situation for 
negative values. Those differences are the dependent variables in the models reported in Table 3 for 
both the pre-campaign and the campaign surveys. 
 
As expected, the greater a party’s margin of victory in 2015 the better the estimate of its 
performance in 2017 relative to its opponent’s. In Labour-held constituencies, for example, in the 
pre-campaign survey for each one percentage point increase in Labour’s 2015 majority the 
estimated difference between the Conservative and Labour estimated likelihood of victory in 2017 
fell by 1.13 points on the 0-100 scale; in the campaign survey the fall was 1.57 points, further 
indication of respondents’ awareness of Labour’s growing support. 
 
Both surveys revealed a substantial, as well as statistically significant, difference in the 
estimated likelihoods given by those who identified strongly with a party compared to those who did 
not. Pre-campaign, for example, in Labour-held marginals the average gap between the estimates of 
a Conservative and a Labour victory was 15.21 points larger for Conservative strong identifiers than 
for those not identifying with the party. Contact with a party in the weeks before the campaign 
began had no influence on the gap, but during the campaign it did: contact with the Labour party 
                                                          
11 In all of these analyses we use any contact with the party as the independent variable. Such contact may be 
little more than receipt of a leaflet through the door and it has been argued (e.g. Pattie et al., 2003, 2012) that 
personal contact – on the doorstep or in the street, for example – provides a better indicator of the party 
seeking to inform and convince. However, exploration with alternative definitions of contact provided no 
substantially different results. 
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reduced it by 8-9 points, while in Conservative-held seats contact with the Conservatives increased it 
by 6.67 points. 
 
The campaign’s progress made a difference, too. The gap closed substantially as it 
proceeded, as shown by the large, statistically significant negative coefficients. In Labour-held seats, 
the difference moved by 12.64 points towards Labour by the campaign’s last eight days compared to 
its first eight, for example. But again, there was very little evidence that respondents were clearly 
aware of which party was most likely to win which seat. The pre-campaign regression for Labour 
indicates a gap of 8.42 points between the expectations of the two parties which, given the 
definition of that variable, indicates a Conservative lead over Labour. On average, therefore, 
respondents thought that Labour would lose seats to the Conservatives. That gap closed during the 
campaign to a statistically insignificant difference of only 1.69 points (on a 101-point scale): 
respondents were aware that Labour was closing on the Conservatives in the overall polls, but the 
analyses here suggest that they were not clear which seats it would gain. 
 
A fourth model looks at changes in respondents’ evaluations of the two parties’ prospects. 
Some 40 per cent of respondents changed their opinion as to which party was most likely to win – 
e.g. placed the likelihood of a Conservative local victory higher than that for a Labour victory in the 
pre-campaign survey but placed Labour higher during the campaign survey – and not all were 
correct. Table 4 shows the percentage of respondents who changed their views of the most likely 
winner according to the direction of that change, the period of the survey, and the actual winner in 
their constituency. The first two columns refer to those who estimated in the pre-campaign survey 
that the Conservatives would win in their constituency but that Labour would win when they were 
questioned in the campaign survey. Of those who responded in the early stage of that latter survey 
11 per cent said that Labour would win but the Conservatives did, whereas 89 per cent said that 
Labour would win, and it did. 
 
Those first two columns show that the great majority of those who changed their 
assessment from a Conservative to a Labour victory in Labour-held marginals were correct, perhaps 
not surprisingly given that Labour retained all but six of those seats. The next two columns, on the 
other hand, show that the majority who switched from favouring a Labour to a Conservative win 
were wrong – Labour retained the seats in most cases. But those interviewed in the last half of the 
campaign were about twice as likely to be right as those interviewed in the first half: as the 
campaign proceeded, a few more local respondents successfully identified which Labour-held 
marginals were going to be lost to the Conservatives. 
 
Turning to the Conservative-held marginals, the next two columns show that – by a margin 
of around 2 to 1 and with no appreciable change across the campaign periods – those who switched 
their forecast from a Conservative to a Labour win were more likely to be wrong than right. Of those 
who switched their assessment in the other direction, however (i.e. in the final two columns), early 
in the campaign a majority wrongly identified which seats the Conservatives were going to retain; 
later, however, they were more likely to be right than wrong. 
 
Overall, therefore, the pattern of change did not suggest that most respondents were aware 
whether their constituencies were likely to switch allegiance at the election. This is confirmed by the 
regressions in Table 5, in which the dependent variable is the difference between respondents’ 
assessed likelihood of the party winning in the campaign survey compared to the pre-campaign (i.e. 
a positive value indicates a higher likelihood in the campaign survey). The R2 values are extremely 
small and few regression coefficients are statistically significant. Among the latter, the only 
substantial findings are that, in both Labour- and Conservative-held marginals, estimates of a Labour 
victory increased substantially as the campaign proceeded. Voters were aware of Labour’s advances 
 11 
 
nationally and responded accordingly in their local constituencies, but the much weaker shifts in the 
other direction for the Conservatives suggest that this did not lead many of them to also downgrade 
their assessments of a Conservative victory: Labour were thought to be doing better but 
insufficiently well to make substantial gains in the number of MPs. Of further interest in these 
findings is that three of the four coefficients for the margin of victory at the 2015 election are 
statistically insignificant; only in the Labour-held marginals was the increase in the likelihood of a 
Labour victory linked to its previous performance. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The majority of English voters successfully predicted which party was going to win in their home 
constituency when the 2017 general election was called, not surprisingly given that most of those 
constituencies were won by large majorities in 2015 and were very unlikely to change hands. Voters 
living in the marginal constituencies being contested by Labour and the Conservatives were less 
likely to make a correct prediction, however. In line with opinion poll data and general expectations, 
in most of those seats a Conservative victory was considered the most likely just after the election 
was called but as the campaign proceeded Labour gained ground on the Conservatives nationally. 
That trend was noted by survey respondents, many of whom increased their estimates of the 
likelihood of a Labour victory locally, while not substantially down-grading their estimates of a likely 
Conservative win.  
 
For each party, those who strongly identified with it estimated its chances of victory 
substantially higher than those who did not, and those contacted by a party – especially by Labour – 
during the campaign also rated its chances higher than those who were not: intense local canvassing 
clearly convinces voters that a party considers it has an excellent chance of winning there. But these 
were general trends that applied across all Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies. Voters 
were much less able to distinguish the variations from those trends; few successfully identified 
whether their home constituency would be captured by the second-placed party at the previous 
contest. The ‘wisdom of crowds’ tracked the general trends much better than the local ones. 
 
Given the growing interest amongst UK pollsters and others in providing estimates of the 
likelihood of an election result not just for the country as a whole but also in each individual 
constituency, the responses to questions such as those analysed here appear to offer a possible 
approach to that goal and an input to debates about its feasibility. However, analyses of some of the 
first attempts to forecast the outcome in each seat have indicated the potential fallibility of those 
responses in the marginal constituencies where general elections are won and lost (Johnston et al., 
2018). The 2017 UK general election may have been exceptional, given the magnitude of the 
changes in the two parties’ fortunes during the campaign, the variability in those changing fortunes 
across the marginal constituencies, and the consequential apparently random pattern to which of 
those seats did change hands. Caution is clearly necessary, therefore; the crowds may not be as wise 
where the outcome is on a knife-edge as in the places where it is almost certain.  
 
Predicting an election outcome in district-based systems is difficult because of the 
geographies, and especially the changing geographies, of support for the competing parties. In some 
constituencies prediction may be straightforward because one party dominates there and invariably 
provides the winning candidate. Elsewhere, however, the outcome may be less certain because 
neither party is dominant. Asking voters the likely outcome in the former constituency type should 
find that most correctly identify the winner – the same party as at the last election. The analyses of 
the 2017 election in England reported here have shown that this was not the case in the more 
marginal constituencies, however. Survey respondents were aware of both the relative position of 
the parties nationally and trends in their support during the campaign but were much less accurate 
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in translating that into the local situation. The findings reported here might be taken as indicating 
that successful citizen forecasting of the likely outcome in marginal constituencies is not a feasible 
goal; or they might suggest the need for exploring a range of possible instruments with different 
scales, and whether even larger sample sizes are needed. 
 
 
Relying on the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ to provide an accurate picture of the outcome 
nationally is far from unproblematic, therefore; especially where the contest is a close one locally 
and there are substantial shifts in party support during the campaign voters – perhaps not 
surprisingly – may be unable to predict the local outcome accurately, with clear consequences for 
the national estimates.  
 
  
 13 
 
References 
 
Allen, N. 2018. Gambling with the electorate. In Allen, N. and Bartle, J. (eds.) None Past the Post: 
Britain at the Polls, 2017. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1-33. 
 
Bartels, L. M., Achen, C. H. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive 
Government. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Blackwell, M., Honaker, J. and King, G. 2017. A Unified Approach to Measurement Error and Missing 
Data: Overview and Applications. Sociological Methods and Research, 46, 303-341. 
 
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., Stokes, D. E. 1960. The American Voter. The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Curtice, J. 2015. A return to normality? How the electoral system operated. In Geddes, A., Tonge, J. 
(eds.) The British General Election of 2015. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 25-40. 
 
Curtice, J. 2018. How the electoral system failed to deliver – again. In Tonge, J., Leiston-Bandira, C. 
and Wilks-Heeg, S. (eds.) The British General Election of 2018. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
29-45. 
 
Curtice, J., Fisher, S., Kuha, J. and Mellon, J. (2017) Focus: on the 2017 Exit Poll – another surprise, 
another success. Discover Society, 5 July 2017: focus-on-the-2017-exit-poll-another-surprise-
another-success. 
 
Delli Carpini, M. X. 2005. An Overview of the State of Citizens' Knowledge About Politics. In 
McKinney, M. S., Kaid, L. L., Bystrom, D. G., Carlin, D. B. (eds.) Communicating Politics: 
Engaging the Public in Democratic Life, Peter Lang, New York, 27-40. Retrieved 27 January 
2018 from http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/53. 
 
Delli Carpini, M. X., Keeter, S. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters. Yale 
University Press, New Haven CT. 
 
Denver, D. 2018. The results: how Britain voted. In Tonge, J., Leiston-Bandira, C. and Wilks-Heeg, S. 
(eds.) The British General Election of 2018. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 8-28. 
 
Ferejohn, J. A. 1990. Information and the electoral process. In Ferejohn, J. A., Kuklinski, J. H. (eds.) 
Information and Democratic Processes. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 234-253. 
 
Graefe, A. 2014. Accuracy of vote expectation surveys in forecasting elections. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 78, 204-232. 
 
Gudgin, G. and Taylor, P. J. 1979. Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organisation of Elections. London: Pion 
(reprinted 1979 – Colchester: ECPR Press). 
 
Johnston, R. J., Pattie, C. J., Dorling, D. and Rossiter, D. J. 2001. From Votes to Seats: the Operation of 
the UK Electoral System since 1945. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Johnston, R. J., Pattie, C. J. 2006. Putting Voters in Their Place: Geography and Elections in Great 
Britain. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
 14 
 
Johnston, R. J., Pattie, C. J. 2014. Money and Electoral Politics: Local Parties and Funding in General 
Elections. The Policy Press, Bristol. 
 
Johnston, R. J., Pattie, C. J. and Hartman, T. K. 2019. Local knowledge, local learning and predicting 
election outcomes: voter assessments of likely party success in Scotland’s constituencies at 
the 2015 and 2017 general elections. Scottish Affairs,  
 
Johnston, R. J., Rossiter, D. J., Hartman, T., Pattie, C. J., Manley, D. and Jones, K. 2018. Are we going 
to win in that seat? An exploration of constituency-level estimates at the 2017 British general 
election. International Journal of Market Research, 60, 463-483. 
 
Leiter, D., Murr, A., Ramirez, E. R. and Stegmaier, M. 2018. Social networks and citizen forecasting; 
the more friends the better. International Journal of Forecasting, 34, 235-248. 
 
Lenz, G. 2012. Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Lewis-Beck, M. S. and Skalaban, A. 1989. Citizen forecasting: can voters see into the future? British 
Journal of Political Science, 36, 617-634. 
 
Lewis-Beck, M. S., Stegmaier, M. 2011. Citizen forecasting: can UK voters see the future? Electoral 
Studies, 30, 264-268.  
 
Murr, A. E. 2011. ‘Wisdom of crowds’? A decentralised election forecasting model that uses citizens’ 
local expectations. Electoral Studies, 30, 771-783. 
 
Murr, A. E. 2015a. The party leadership model: an early forecast of the 2015 British General Election. 
Research and Politics, 2 (2), doi 10.1177/2053168015583346 
 
Murr, A. E. 2015b. The wisdom of crowds: applying Condorcet’s jury theorem to forecasting US 
Presidential Elections. International Journal of Forecasting, 31, 916-929. 
 
Murr, A. E. 2016. The wisdom of crowds: what do citizens forecast for the 2015 British general 
election? Electoral Studies, 41, 283-288. 
 
Neuman, W. R. 1986. The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American 
Electorate. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Pattie, C. J., Johnston, R. J. 2003. Hanging on the telephone? Doorstep and telephone canvassing at 
the British General Election of 1997. British Journal of Political Science, 33, 303-322. 
 
Pattie, C. J., Johnston, R. J. 2012. The growing impact of telephone political canvassing at the 2005 
British General Election. International Journal of Marketing Research, 54,49-70. 
 
Shipman, T. 2017. Fall Out. A Year of Political Mayhem. William Collins, London. 
 
Stiers, D. and Dassonneville, R. 2018. Affect versus cognition: wishful thinking on election day. An 
analysis using exit poll data from Belgium. International Journal of Forecasting, 34, 199-215. 
 
 15 
 
Table 1. Regressions of respondents’ pre-campaign estimates of the likelihood of each party winning 
in their home constituency in the Labour- and Conservative-held marginal seats (coefficients 
significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold). 
 
Marginals Won By                   Labour    Conservative 
Party Winning Labour Conservative Labour Conservative  
  coeff. se coeff. Se coeff.  se  coeff.  se 
Constant 56.03 3.59 56.42 3.16 47.42 3.09  57.07 2.45 
Victory Margin 2015 0.31 0.15 -0.82 0.15 -0.49 0.15 0.63 0.12 
Interest in Politics (comparator: not interested) 
 Not very -0.57 3.58 9.71 3.60 -1.62 3.29 8.40 2.71 
 Somewhat 4.49 3.13 8.55 3.15 2.21 2.90 9.68 2.39 
 Very 8.86 3.10 7.17 3.12 1.84 2.89 10.17 2.38 
Labour Identifier (comparator: not a Labour identifier) 
 Not very strong 2.85 2.64 -0.31 2.65 1.84 2.89 10.17 2.38  
 Fairly strong 6.15 1.95 -0.46 1.97 4.56 1.79 -1.19 1.47 
 Very strong 9.68 2.48 -7.52 2.50 7.16 2.30 -5.04 1.89 
Conservative Identifier (comparator: not a Conservative identifier) 
 Not very strong -0.08 3.08 0.52 3.10 -1.78 2.42 1.98 2.00  
 Fairly strong -1.53 2.04 1.46 2.06 -5.75 1.63 4.98 1.34 
 Very strong -10.52 3.15 4.69 3.17 -10.19 2.45 7.23 2.02 
Contact from Party in Last Four Weeks 
 Labour 1.02 1.78 0.22 1.79 4.73 1.64 -0.02 1.35  
 Conservative 2.93 2.40 0.13 2.42 -1.23 1.58 2.27 1.31 
Which Party Won in 2017 
 Labour -4.40 2.24   0.26 1.38 
 Conservative   -4.02 2.26   -2.27 1.14 
R2  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.06   
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Table 2. Regressions of respondents’ estimates during the campaign of the likelihood of each party 
winning in their home constituency in the Labour- and Conservative-held marginal seats (coefficients 
significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold). 
 
Marginals Won By                   Labour     Conservative 
Party Winning Labour Conservative 
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
Constant 51.41 2.79 68.98 2.14 49.87 2.04 69.01 1.51  
Victory Margin 2015 0.85 0.14 -0.71 0.14 -0.69 0.14 +0.63 0.11  
Interest in Politics (comparator: not interested) 
 Not very -4.90 2.56 -0.69 2.60 -2.78 2.21 -1.65 1.77  
 Somewhat -0.92 1.93 1.02 1.96 1.34 1.65 0.98 1.32 
 Very 0.73 1.88 0.71 1.91 -0.11 1.62 1.92 1.30 
Response Quartile (comparator: Early) 
 Early-Mid 1.02 1.74 1.24 1.76 5.43 1.50 -1.89 1.12 
 Mid-Late 4.89 1.80 -3.24 1.82 8.50 1.60 -1.31 1.28 
 Late 8.36 1.84 -4.27 1.86 11.95 1.59 -3.17 1.27 
Labour Identifier (comparator: not a Labour identifier) 
 Not very strong 2.02 2.63 -1.97 2.67 -1.29 2.61 3.36 2.08 
 Fairly strong 5.55 1.93 -3.05 1.96 3.15 1.79 -0.33 1.43 
 Very strong 9.52 2.45 -8.08 2.48 8.28 2.38 -2.97 1.90 
Conservative Identifier (comparator: not a Conservative identifier) 
 Not very strong -1.10 3.00 1.56 3.04 -4.27 2.42 4.35 1.94 
 Fairly strong -2.73 2.07 2.01 2.10 -2.78 2.21 3.73 1.33 
 Very strong -6.75 3.18 4.96 3.22 -7.54 2.42 5.88 1.94 
Contact from Party in Last Four Weeks 
 Labour 6.31 1.51 -3.66 1.53 5.53 1.45 -2.85 1.16  
 Conservative 0.99 1.55 1.20 1.57 -3.09 1.41 3.56 1.13 
Which Party Won in 2017 
 Labour -1.04 2.11   -0.87 1.29 
 Conservative   -0.65 2.14   -0.46 1.03 
R2  0.09  0.04  0.08  0.05  
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Table 3. Regressions of the difference in respondents’ estimates of the likelihood of each party 
winning in their home constituency in the Labour- and Conservative-held marginal seats in their pre-
campaign and campaign surveys (coefficients significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in 
bold). 
 
                Pre-Campaign                 Campaign 
Marginals Won By Labour Conservative Labour Conservative 
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
Constant -3.61 5.87 9.40 4.22 16.92 4.42 20.02 2.56  
Victory Margin 2015 -1.13 0.25 1.11 0.21 -1.57 0.24 1.33 0.19 
Interest in Politics (comparator: not interested) 
 Not very 10.28 5.85 10.02 4.67 4.21 4.06 1.13 3.00 
 Somewhat 4.06 5.10 7.48 4.12 1.94 3.05 -0.40 2.25 
 Very -1.70 5.06 8.33 4.10 -0.03 3.00 2.03 2.20 
Response Quartile (comparator: Early) 
 Early-Mid - - - - -0.22 2.74 -7.32 2.03 
 Mid-Late - - - - -8.12 2.84 -9.81 2.17 
 Late - - - - -12.64 2.90 -15.11 2.15 
Labour Identifier (comparator: not a Labour identifier) 
 Not very strong -3.16 4.31 1.67 3.73 -4.00 4.15 4.66 3.55 
 Fairly strong -6.60 3.19 -5.75 2.54 -8.61 3.05 -3.49 2.43 
 Very strong -17.20 4.05 -12.20 3.23 -17.60 3.89 -11.26 3.23 
Conservative Identifier (comparator: not a Conservative identifier) 
 Not very strong 0.60 5.03 3.76 3.44 2.66 4.74 8.62 3.29 
 Fairly strong 2.99 3.35 10.73 2.31 4.73 3.28 13.37 2.25  
 Very strong 15.21 2.14 17.42 3.48 11.71 5.02 13.42 3.30 
Contact from Party in Last Four Weeks 
 Labour -0.80 2.91 -4.75 2.33 -9.97 2.38 -8.39 1.97 
 Conservative -2.80 3.93 3.50 2.25 0.21 2.45 6.67 1.91 
Which Party Won in 2017 
 Labour 8.42 3.67   1.69. 3.32  
 Conservative   -2.01 1.96   -1.33 1.75 
R2  0.05  0.07  0.10  0.12  
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Table 4. The percentage of respondents who changed their estimate of which party would win in 
their home constituency according to which party did win there in 2017. 
 
Marginal Held by Labour Conservative 
Change of Winner Con-Lab Lab-Con Con-Lab Lab-Con 
Winner 2017 Con Lab Con Lab Con Lab Con Lab 
Early 11 89 11 89 60 40 43 57 
Early-Mid 6 94 10 90 70 30 70 30 
Mid-Late 11 89 21 79 67 33 87 13 
Late 5 95 24 76 63 37 71 29 
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Table 5. Regressions of changes in respondents’ estimates of the likelihood of each party winning in 
their home constituency in the Labour- and Conservative-held marginal seats between the pre-
campaign and campaign surveys (coefficients significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in 
bold). 
 
Marginals Held By                   Labour                  Conservative 
Change for Labour Conservative Labour Conservative 
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
Constant -13.6 4.87 7.60 4.33 -1.37 3.47 10.31 2.87 
Victory Margin 2015 0.49 0.19 -0.23 0.18 -0.01 0.16 0.01 0.14 
Interest in Politics (comparator: not interested) 
 Not very 5.46 4.58 -6.61 4.58 3.67 3.53 -8.16 3.01 
 Somewhat 3.71 4.06 -3.40 4.07 2.19 3.12 -8.00 2.67 
 Very 1.75 4.03 -2.90 4.04 2.12 3.11 -7.49 2.66 
Response Quartile (comparator: Early) 
 Early-Mid 2.97 2.25 -0.54 2.23 3.51 1.70 -1.22 1.46 
 Mid-Late 8.25 2.33 -3.09 2.30 8.54 1.82 -1.43 1.55 
 Late 12.15 2.41 -5.10 2.38 11.79 1.80 -2.71 1.51 
Labour Identifier (comparator: not a Labour identifier) 
 Not very strong -1.15 3.15 -1.85 3.10 -4.68 2.75 -1.34 2.36 
 Fairly strong 0.40 2.34 -2.72 2.31 2.46 1.86 1.35 1.58 
 Very strong -0.72 2.91 -0.96 2.89 2.01 2.44 2.19 2.09 
Conservative Identifier (comparator: not a Conservative identifier) 
 Not very strong -1.40 3.66 3.77 3.64 -2.34 2.52 3.74 2.16 
 Fairly strong -2.44 2.47 1.20 2.44 -5.46 1.71 -0.29 1.46  
 Very strong 4.33 3.88 2.90 3.85 -0.34 2.51 1.67 2.16 
Contact from Party in Last Four Weeks 
 Labour 1.53 1.97 0.22 1.95 -0.81 1.63 0.20 1.39 
 Conservative 0.94 2.00 -0.52 1.98 0.15 1.58 0.43 1.34 
Which Party Won in 2017 
 Labour 2.96 2.71   -0.26 1.45 
 Conservative   2.89 2.66   0.21 1.24 
R2  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The majority in the Conservative-Labour marginal constituencies at the 2015 and 2017 
general elections. 
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Figure 2. The percentage of respondents who correctly predicted which party would win in their 
home constituency in England at the 2017 general election, prior to the campaign: all constituencies 
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Figure 3. The mean belief of respondents that their vote would make a difference in their home 
constituency in England at the 2017 general election, prior to the campaign: all constituencies 
 
 
 23 
 
 
Figure 4. The percentage of respondents who correctly predicted the winning party in the 2017 pre-
campaign survey in the Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies, according to which party won 
there in 2017 
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Figure 5. The changing mean expectations of the Conservative and Labour parties winning a House 
of Commons majority according to the daily surveys during the campaign. 
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Figure 6. The expectations of a Labour victory by constituency (for a 1-in-5 random sample of 
constituencies) according to the pre-campaign survey. The mean value (for a score between 0 and 
100) is shown on the vertical axis by a circle and the standard deviation around that by the vertical 
lines. (Because the distributions are highly skewed – especially at the extremes – some of the +1sd 
values exceed 100 and some of then -sd values are below 0.) 
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Figure 7. Mean Expectations of Labour and Conservative constituency wins in the Labour-
Conservative marginal seats (a) according to the pre-campaign survey and (b) according to those 
surveyed in the final ten days of the campaign 
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Figure 8. Changes in the mean expectations of (a) Labour and (b) Conservative constituency wins 
between the pre-campaign survey and the survey in the last ten days of the campaign. 
 
  
 28 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean expectations of (a) Labour and (b) Conservative constituency victories according to 
those surveyed in the last ten days of the campaign. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
